Saturday, 31 May 2014

Consumer spending declines


In this Friday, Nov. 23, 2012 file photo, a cashier rings up a sale at a Sears store in Las Vegas. Consumer spending fell unexpectedly in April as incomes slowed.

Read more here: http://www.fresnobee.com/2014/05/30/3952820/consumer-spending-declines.html?sp=/99/170/#storylink=cpy
WASHINGTON — Consumer spending unexpectedly fell in April after the biggest surge in almost five years as incomes slowed, a sign the largest part of the U.S. economy will take time to accelerate.
Household purchases, which account for about 70% of the economy, dropped 0.1%, the first decrease in a year, after a revised 1% gain the prior month that was the strongest reading since August 2009, Commerce Department figures showed Friday in Washington. The median forecast of 77 economists in a Bloomberg survey called for a 0.2% rise. Incomes advanced 0.3% after climbing 0.5%.
Friday's report underscores the need for faster progress in the job market that would spur wage gains and provide more households with the means to spend. At the same time, March and April figures together paint a picture of steady demand that's helping companies, signaling purchases will contribute to the economy's rebound this quarter.
"The March gain in spending was huge, and April brings us back to something more reasonable," said Stephen Stanley, chief economist at Pierpont Securities in Stamford, Conn. "We need to see an acceleration in labor income, and we really haven't had that yet. Consumer spending is likely to be steady but nothing spectacular."
Friday's figures showed that adjusting consumer spending for inflation, which generates the figures used to calculate gross domestic product, purchases fell 0.3% in April, the most since September 2009.
Projections for April spending ranged from a decline of 0.1% to a gain of 0.5% after a previously reported increase of 0.9%. The Bloomberg survey median also called for incomes to rise 0.3%.
The report follows figures Thursday that showed the economy contracted at a 1% annualized rate from January through March, the first decline in three years, as companies added to inventories at a slower pace. Consumer purchases grew at a 3.1% rate, reflecting a surge in spending on services including utilities and health care, after climbing at a 3.3% pace in the final three months of 2013.
Economists project gross domestic product to expand at a 3.5% rate in the current quarter, according to the median forecast in a Bloomberg survey from May 2 to May 7.

Source:




Read more here: http://www.fresnobee.com/2014/05/30/3952820/consumer-spending-declines.html?sp=/99/170/#storylink=cpy

Friday, 30 May 2014

Japan tax hike lifts inflation to 23-year high

TOKYO (AP) — Japan's consumer prices rose 3.2 percent from a year earlier in April to the highest level since 1991, the government said Friday, largely due to a sales tax increase that is expected to dent growth this quarter.
Other April data for the world's third-largest economy were largely in line with forecasts. Industrial production fell 2.5 percent from a year earlier and household spending sank 4.6 percent. Unemployment was 3.6 percent, the same as in March.
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's policies aimed at ending a deflationary slump that has slowed growth for nearly two decades have made some headway, though the inflation rate remains well below the 2 percent target set by the central bank and government when the tax hike is factored out.
Japan raised its sales tax to 8 percent in April from 5 percent. Japan's central bank estimates that 1.7 percentage points of the inflation rate in April could be attributed to the tax hike. The 3.2 percent figure is for the core consumer price index, which excludes fresh food.
In its latest assessment of Japan's recovery, the International Monetary Fund said Friday that Japan appeared to be weathering the sales tax increase and exports are expected to begin picking up as demand overseas rebounds. It forecast that inflation would remain modest at 1.1 percent in 2014.
But it cautioned that Japan needs deep, structural reforms to support growth.
"Near-term risks to the outlook are balanced, but the sustainability of the recovery over the medium term is at risk," it said.
Consumers and businesses ramped up spending ahead of the tax increase, boosting demand temporarily. The economy is expected to contract or at least slow sharply this quarter.
Economists say wage increases are needed to ensure the strong consumer demand that would prompt companies to begin investing more for future growth.
Shortages of labor in some areas, such as construction and trucking, have been pushing prices and to a limited extent wages higher. But so far overall incomes have not kept pace with the tax hike and price increases.
Prices in Japan rose partly due to higher costs for energy as the yen weakened against the dollar because of massive monetary easing. Many businesses raised prices or offered less for the same price to compensate for their own higher costs.
Revving up consumer demand through stronger purchasing power will be crucial, said Stephan Danninger, Asia and Pacific division chief for the International Monetary Fund.
"The need for inflation to be meaningful in contributing to a stable and faster growing economy is through demand and not through the input of higher prices," he told a seminar in Tokyo on Friday.
The dollar is now buying about 101 yen compared with 80 yen two years ago. But the yen's recent stabilization near 101 to the dollar means inflation is getting less of a push from the exchange rate than it did last year.
"The sharp fall in import price inflation points to a slowdown in consumer inflation in coming months, which should provide some relief to households' battered finances," Capital Economics analyst Marcel Thieliant said in a commentary.
Massive monetary easing by the Bank of Japan has mainly given the government leeway to work on reforms needed to enhance Japan's competitiveness in the longer run and to repair government finances, said Masaaki Kanno, chief economist at JP Morgan in Tokyo.
The April 1 tax hike and a further 2 percentage point increase planned for next year are part of the government's effort to bring under control Japan's huge public debt, which is more than twice the size of the economy.
"One of the most important roles is for the BOJ to buy time," said Kanno.

Source:

Thursday, 29 May 2014

A Pushback on Green Power

As renewable energy production has surged in recent years, opponents of government policies that have helped spur its growth have pushed to roll back those incentives and mandates in state after state.
On Wednesday, they claimed their first victory, when Ohio lawmakers voted to freeze the phasing-in of power that utilities must buy from renewable energy sources.
The bill, which passed the Ohio House of Representatives, 54 to 38, was expected to be signed into law by Gov. John R. Kasich, who helped negotiate its final draft.
It stands in marked contrast to the broad consensus behind the original law in 2008, when it was approved with virtually no opposition, and comes after considerable disagreement among lawmakers, energy executives and public interest groups.
Opponents of the mandates argued, in part, that wind and solar power, whose costs have plunged in recent years, should compete on their own with traditional fossil fuels. But the debate has taken on a broader, more political tone as well, analysts say, with disagreements over the role of government, the economic needs of the state and the debate over climate change.
“It used to be that renewables was this Kumbaya, come-together moment for Republicans and Democrats,” said Michael E. Webber, deputy director of the Energy Institute at the University of Texas at Austin. “The intellectual rhetoric around why you would want renewables has been lost and replaced by partisanship.”
Since 2013, more than a dozen states have taken up proposals to weaken or eliminate green energy mandates and incentives, often helped by conservative and libertarian policy or advocacy groups like the Heartland InstituteAmericans for Prosperity and the American Legislative Exchange Council.
In Kansas, for example, lawmakers recently defeated a bill that would have phased out the state’s renewable energy mandates, but its backers have vowed to propose it again.
Jay Apt, director of the Electricity Industry Center at Carnegie Mellon University, said the Ohio battle was “another skirmish in the question of whether we are committed to cleaning up pollution, and people are divided.” He added, “Renewable portfolio standards and other mechanisms of pollution control are not cost-free.”
The Ohio bill freezes mandates that require utilities to gradually phase in the purchase of 25 percent of their power from alternative sources, including wind, solar and emerging technologies like clean coal production, by 2025. While the freeze is in effect for two years, a commission would study the issue.
At the federal level, alternative energy industries like solar and wind have pushed hard in recent years to preserve important tax breaks that they say have helped spur new development and sharply increased the supply of clean energy flowing into the grid.
But the demand for that energy has been largely propelled at the state level by mandates, known as renewable portfolio standards, that generally set goals for utilities to increase the percentage of green energy they include in the power they buy for their customers.
Roughly 30 states have the standards, which can range from modest voluntary goals like Indiana’s target of 10 percent by 2025 to more aggressive requirements like Hawaii’s, which aim for 40 percent by 2030, according to the Department of Energy.
“Energy markets are highly policy-driven,” said Todd Foley, senior vice president of policy and government relations at the American Council on Renewable Energy. “When states and even the federal government continually revisit these policies, it sends a signal of uncertainty. It chills market and investment momentum.”
In Ohio, where opponents of the mandate argued that it raised the price of electricity and supporters worried about the loss of economic development and jobs, Mr. Kasich worked to broker the compromise bill, said a spokesman for the governor.
“We rejected the efforts by those who’d like to kill renewable energy altogether, and instead we’re moving forward in a balanced way that supports renewable energy while also preserving the economic recovery that’s created more than 250,000 jobs,” the spokesman, Rob Nichols, said. “It’s not what everyone wanted, which probably means we came down at the right spot.”
Eli Miller, Americans for Prosperity’s Ohio state director, backed by the billionaire industrialists David H. and Charles G. Koch, called the proposed law “a prudent step” to re-examine standards that could be a “potential impediment to job creation and job growth here in the Buckeye State.”
But Gabe Elsner, executive director of the Energy and Policy Institute, a pro-renewables group that sees efforts to weaken incentives and mandates as part of a campaign by utility and fossil fuel interests, said the temporary halt could do away with the law entirely.
“The fossil fuel and utility industry has been caught off guard by the rise of cheap, clean energy, and over the past 18 months they’ve responded in a really big way across the country,” he said. “We’re seeing the results of that campaign now in Ohio.”
Renewable energy still represents a small fraction of the overall energy mix, reaching about 6 percent of net generation in 2013, according to the United States Energy Information Administration. But it is on the rise, representing 30 percent of power plant capacity added that year.
For renewable developers, the outlook is uncertain. Michael Speerschneider, chief permitting and public policy officer for EverPower, which recently won approval to develop a 176-turbine project in Ohio, said the ruling would make it more difficult to find a buyer for the power, dimming prospects for doing business in the state.
“We came to Ohio based on the policies that were in place,” he said. “Changing that now, freezing it, just sends a message that says, ‘Now, we don’t want you here anymore.’ ”


Source:

Wednesday, 28 May 2014

Pilgrim’s Pride Makes a $6.4 Billion Proposal to Buy Hillshire Brands

Hillshire’s brands include Hillshire Farm, Jimmy Dean, State Fair and Ball Park.
When Hillshire Brands announced its intention this month to buy Pinnacle Foods for $4.3 billion, analysts and investors scratched their heads over the wisdom of the combination.
But another company — Pilgrim’s Pride, a huge producer of poultry — saw an opportunity.
Pilgrim’s Pride offered on Tuesday to pay $6.4 billion for Hillshire, including the assumption of debt, in an bid to derail the earlier proposed deal and solidify its role as one of the country’s top sellers of meat.
The bid by Pilgrim’s Pride and its majority owner, the Brazilian meatpacking titan JBS, sets up a potential battle over Hillshire, best known for its namesake hams and Jimmy Dean sausages.
They are hoping to take advantage of restiveness among Hillshire shareholders, who have questioned the rationale for a multibillion-dollar deal for Pinnacle, whose brands include Vlasic pickles and Birds Eye frozen vegetables. At least one large investor, the hedge fund Eminence Capital, has said publicly that it would vote against the earlier deal.
Under the terms of that deal, Hillshire would pay $18 a share in cash and half a share for each Pinnacle share. As of Friday, that offer was worth $36.51 a share.
By contrast, Pilgrim’s Pride plans to pay $45 a share in cash for Hillshire, about 22 percent more than the company’s closing share price on Friday and 25 percent higher than the volume-weighted average price over the last 10 trading days.
Together, the two companies would have had $12.4 billion in sales over the last 12 months.
Some analysts said they favored the new takeover proposal. In a research note, analysts at JPMorgan Chase wrote that they believed the Pinnacle deal was not the best use of Hillshire’s resources. By contrast, a merger with another meat company appeared to be a better bet, they said.
“We think joining two protein companies makes a lot more sense than marrying a meat company with one that has a focus on frozen vegetables,” the JPMorgan analysts wrote.
Breaking up the Pinnacle deal could leave one notable investor in the lurch. The Blackstone Group, the private equity behemoth, owns about 51 percent of Pinnacle and had looked to the Hillshire deal as a way to sell its stake.
The bid by Pilgrim’s Pride represents a second chance for JBS to take over the Hillshire brands. JBS made a takeover bid three years ago for what was then Sara Lee, which encompassed the meat operations and a coffee and tea business that has since been spun off, but was rebuffed.
By that point, JBS had already bought a 75 percent stake in Pilgrim’s, helping to lift the poultry producer out of bankruptcy.
About three months ago, Pilgrim’s Pride approached Hillshire about a potential merger but was rebuffed, according to a person briefed on the matter. After learning about the company’s deal for Pinnacle this month, it decided to act.
Behind the unsolicited bid is a clause in the Pinnacle proposal that allows Hillshire’s board to weigh a takeover bid for the company that is reasonably likely to lead to a superior outcome for shareholders.
“We are coming forward now because the opportunity for your shareholders to obtain the compelling value represented by our proposal will no longer exist if the proposed acquisition of Pinnacle is consummated,” Bill Lovette, the president and chief executive of Pilgrim’s Pride, wrote in a public letter to his counterpart at Hillshire Brands, Sean Connolly.
Pilgrim’s Pride, which is based in Greeley, Colo., emphasized that it intended to keep Hillshire’s hometown, Chicago, as a principal base of its operations.
While executives of Pilgrim’s Pride have indicated that they hope to keep matters civil, they have not explicitly ruled out more aggressive takeover maneuvers. For now, however, they are betting that investors will put pressure on Hillshire’s management and board and that in any vote shareholders would reject the Pinnacle deal.

In a statement, Hillshire said that while it continued to “strongly believe” in the strategic rationale for its proposed deal with Pinnacle, its board would examine the new takeover offer as part of its fiduciary duties to shareholders.
Shares in Hillshire jumped 22 percent on Tuesday, to $45.19, suggesting that investors expect an even higher bid soon. The JPMorgan analysts suggested that other potential buyers, including Tyson and Cargill, might yet emerge.
Shares in Pilgrim’s Pride rose 1.7 percent, to $25.52, while those in Pinnacle fell 5.4 percent, to $31.48.
Pilgrim’s Pride is being advised by Lazard and the law firm Cravath, Swaine & Moore. Hilshire is being advised by Centerview Partners,Goldman Sachs and the law firm Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom.

Source:
dealbook.nytimes.com

L'Affaire Piketty

On Friday, the Financial Times published allegations by its economics editor Chris Giles that Thomas Piketty’s wealth inequality data in his heralded Capital in the Twenty-First Century gives a suspiciously skewed impression of trends and cross-national rankings. I will confess that I clicked on the link full of schadenfreude; I believe that Piketty’s book is irresponsibly speculative, that his inequality estimates sometimes give the wrong impression, and that his policy preferences would prove harmful to the middle class and poor in the long run.
However, I also believe that few researchers that achieve Piketty’s prominence fake their data, and I have deep respect for how readily Piketty and his colleagues have made vast quantities of data available online for anyone to see. For that matter, having read the book, I know that it cannot be reduced to the charts Giles criticized. And as someone who criticizes research and who is criticized, I have an interest in promoting the fair adjudication of research controversies.
My initial assessment from Friday is mostly unchanged. The Financial Times blew the data issues it identified out of proportion. Giles discovered a couple of clear errors and a number of adjustments that look questionable but have barely any impact on Piketty’s charts. Much of his critique could have been consigned to a footnote to the effect that he uncovered other mistakes and questionable choices that do not actually change Piketty’s results. Giles post is written in a way that makes you think the alleged problems with Piketty’s data are more legion than they are. And he’s made some errors himself along the way.
Only a couple of issues Giles highlighted, for the United Kingdom in 2010 and the United States in 1970 and 1980, appear to matter, but in the worst case for Piketty, they would make the originally unimpressive trends look less ambiguously benign. I find it hard to believe that Piketty intentionally massaged his data to get the results he wanted, based on my familiarity with his previous work, on the relatively small impacts Giles’s issues have on the results, and on the fact that Giles was able to discover the issues in question because Piketty put massive amounts of data online.
Above all, even if Giles is right, the issues would have minimal consequences for Capital’s thesis. That thesis does not hinge at all on whether wealth inequality grew between 1980 and 2010 or whether Europe has higher wealth inequality than the U.S. And if it did, his original results should have been viewed as offering little support for those claims.
Let’s take some of the basic questions one by one, over the course of a few “explainer” columns. (And, yes, I’m still doing a follow-up column about middle class income growth in the U.S.)

1. How much of Giles’s critique is substantively important?
Giles claims that his analysis of Piketty’s alleged data problems shows, “why these problems matter for each one of the four countries prof [sic] Piketty studies – France, Sweden, UK and the US.” That’s not true. Let’s take France and Sweden off the table immediately. Here are the charts Giles created (from his spreadsheet, here) showing Piketty’s published results against what Giles says he should have shown (the red lines):
giles1 
giles2
Giles just didn’t have to say anything about either of these countries. Anything Piketty did wrong (and it doesn’t seem to me that he did much wrong at all) had zero substantive impact on the trend for these two countries. In fact, many of Giles’s specific issues are mostly unproblematic even for the U.S. and U.K.
Giles makes a big deal of the fact that, in computing wealth concentration estimates for Europe, Piketty doesn’t weight Sweden, France, and the U.K. by their population sizes before averaging them. See, now I would have criticized Piketty for calling any average of three countries a valid estimate for “Europe,” but Giles doesn’t go there. In fact, it doesn’t make any difference whether one weights by population size or not. Here is Giles’s money chart, except I’ve added lines using Giles’s preferred estimates but taking simple averages of the three countries (and removed his “alternative” data point for 2010 which is based on incomparable U.K. data—more on that below).
giles3

The reason his and my lines differ from Piketty’s in showing somewhat lower wealth inequality in recent decades is because Giles’s preferred estimates differ from Piketty’s. (And it’s only the U.K. estimates that really matter, and only after 1980, and only for the top ten percent.) The averaging issue has nothing to do with it.
Giles cites an example using the Swedish data of an apparent transcription error by Piketty where a value for one year was mistakenly entered into a spreadsheet as the value for a different year. It’s the one example of a transcription error he cites. You can see the inconsequential impact it has by looking at Piketty’s 1920 data points in the Sweden chart above.
Giles spends a fair amount of space discussing “tweaks” Piketty made, which he views as uniformly suspect. As others have pointed out, when doing long-run trend analysis using multiple data sources, making adjustments to data is often unavoidable for purposes of estimating the trend validly. You might end up with a second-best estimate for this or that data point, but the trend itself might be more accurately depicted, which is the point. I and others have actually criticized Piketty for not making such adjustments in the specific case of U.S. income concentration trends before and after 1986, when major tax reforms altered the amount of ordinary income reported on individual tax returns.
The important thing is to document the adjustments and their rationales as clearly as possible (and, to be sure, if the assumptions required aren’t sufficiently defensible, adjustments shouldn’t be made). It’s fair of Giles to criticize Piketty for insufficient documentation, but he seems overly sure that all of the “tweaks” are illegitimate, particularly given that he does not know these data sources nearly as well as Piketty (true of nearly everyone on the planet). At any rate, he leads this discussion with the French figures from 1810 to 1960. I would encourage you to look back up at that French chart to see whether it is worth worrying about Piketty’s “tweaks” in this case or whether he’s up to funny business. The third of his three examples relates to the British data from 1810 to 1870, but as you can see in the British chart further below, whether Piketty did something wrong or not makes no difference to the trend over those 60 years. I’ll come back to his second example—the U.S. 1970 estimate—below.
Another category of issues Giles considers is “constructed data,” where the provenance of Piketty’s estimates for a number of years is impossible to determine. Here Giles is again right to ding Piketty for insufficient documentation, but with the exception of the U.S. top one percent share for 1970, it makes little difference whether Piketty has “constructed” good or bad estimates. I wish Piketty had clearly noted that his 1910-1950 trend for the top ten percent of Americans simply adds a constant to the top one percent estimates, but it doesn’t change the conclusion about how 1870 compares to 1960 or about how 1960 compares to 2010. (And as I’ll show, his estimates line with another series quite well.)
Giles also has a point when he says that Piketty labels some estimates as being from a year ending in “0” when they actually come from nearby years. These instances should have been clearly documented. But in general they don’t matter substantively. They don’t for any of the three specific examples Giles cites. Assume the worst about Piketty and the evidence here fails to support your mistrust (except perhaps for the U.S top one percent share estimate in “1980,” see below).
Finally, Giles cites a few departures from Piketty’s stated reliance on estate tax data and charges him with “cherry-picking data sources” when he does not rely on the tax data. Actually, he states these as two different sets of problems and suggests that they are more general than the examples he gives for the U.S. and U.K. They aren’t, and Giles has his own problems here.

2. Which of Giles’s specific claims are important for the U.K. estimates?
Here’s a modified version of Giles’s chart, where I’ve just changed the colors and markers to make the different data sources clearer:
giles4
The first thing to note is that if you use the estimates marked “Lindert” and “Atkinson,” Piketty’s series through 1960 are just fine. Giles makes another mistake in his post when he says that rather than a “constructed” estimate for the top ten percent share in 1870 of 87.1 percent, Piketty could have used the published figure of 76.7 percent. Giles pulled that number from the wrong table, as is apparent in his own spreadsheet. The right table shows a published estimate of 83.8 percent—considerably closer to Piketty’s. The most important data issue before 1970 goes unmentioned by Giles. The 1810 and 1870 estimates probably understate wealth inequality because, unlike the later years, they are for households rather than for individuals (see Table 4).
Giles makes a big deal out of the top one percent point for 1970 being higher if you use the “Atkinson” or “ATK” estimates. This is one of those times when Piketty has done himself no favors by failing to adequately document what he’s done. But I think I know what he’s done. Because Piketty wants to produce a consistent long-term series, and because the nineteenth century estimates are for England and Wales, he sticks with estimates for England and Wales rather than the full United Kingdom as long as he can (through 1980). Piketty uses the 1974 estimate for England and Wales as the “1970” estimate (see Table 1).
Why the 1974 estimate? It appears that the estimates through 1972 are not directly comparable to those from 1974 forward. There is a 9.1 point drop in the “Atkinson” estimates for the top one percent between 1972 and 1974. This discontinuity is suggested by the horizontal bar in Table 4.A2 (p. 151) here between 1973 and 1974. Unlike Giles, I gather, I am not a U.K. citizen, but it appears that inheritance tax policy changed in early 1972 so that for the first time, part of an estate could be passed on tax-free to a surviving spouse. In 1975, the inheritance tax was apparently replaced by a broader gift tax that exempted gifts to spouses.
I suspect Piketty had a similar rationale for using the 1981 England/Wales estimate for “1980”. Piketty hasn’t done anything nefarious here, even though he should have included more detail about his choices. His decision to use 1974 for “1970” has the effect of overstating the 1960-70 decline in wealth inequality. This decision and that to use 1981 for “1980” both have the effect of understating the measured 1970 to 1980 decline. But that measured decline is partly an artifact due to tax law change. If you don’t like the (meaningless) 0.1 point increase Piketty shows in the top one percent’s share of wealth from “1970” to “1980,” think of it as a tiny (meaningless) increase from 1974 to 1981. By the way, using the 1981 instead of the 1980 value also understates the increase in wealth inequality Piketty would show for 1980-1990, assuming that the 1990 estimate is right.

At any rate, all of the 1980 estimates in the chart line up for the top one percent share. Meanwhile, for the top ten percent estimates, the “ATK” estimate lines up with Piketty’s in 1970 while the “Atkinson” line is “too high,” but by 1980 the “ATK” estimate is “too low” and the “Atkinson” estimate lines up with Piketty. In part, what you are looking at here is data imprecision. In part, though, the issue is that the “ATK” estimates are better than the “Atkinson” estimates by 1980—but no longer comparable to the Piketty and “Atkinson” estimates (see the discussion here).
Things get murkier after 1980. Those red lines come from what appears to be the only data source on wealth inequality for years between 1982 and 2001, the Inland Revenue Statistics, a government agency. They indicate less wealth inequality than Piketty’s lines, especially for the top ten percent. But they also indicate less wealth inequality than the “ATK” estimates that are themselves incomparable by 1980 to the “Atkinson” estimates. To build a consistent series over time, the red line needs to be adjusted upward, but by how much? I spent a fair amount of time trying to figure out why Piketty did what he did without success.
Note, though, that the 1980-2000 trends for both the top one percent and for the top ten percent point in the direction of small increases in wealth inequality regardless of which data source is used. Piketty’s one percent trend goes from 23 to 27 percent while the IRS data shows 19 to 23 percent—both four-point rises. His ten percent trend goes from 62-63 percent to 68-69 percent while the IRS indicates it rose from 50 to 56 percent—both six-point increases. Wealth inequality was higher in 2000 than in 1980.
What happened between 2000 and 2010? Damned if I know, and I doubt Piketty does either. Giles definitely doesn’t. The source of Piketty’s top ten percent share estimate looks like constructed figures deriving from 2009 data (see the short purple line in the chart). In Giles spreadsheet, he shows pretty clearly that this source is not comparable to the earlier red-line series from IRS. It finds the top ten percent owned 72 percent of wealth from 2001 to 2003, compared with 54 percent in the IRS series for 2002. But then it’s completely unclear whether it’s comparable to the “Atkinson” series either, as Piketty seems to assume it is.
What I do know is that Giles exhortation about the Office of National Statistics Wealth and Assets Survey being more consistent with the earlier series is bunk. With the exception of this source, all of the other statistics rely on methods based on estate/inheritance tax data. The Wealth and Assets Survey collects information from household interviews. While it may produce more accurate estimates for any given year than the other sources, it almost surely produces an invalid downward trend if connected to the earlier sources. The way to think about this is to realize that if the survey had been conducted continuously back to 1980, the wealth inequality levels would most likely be much lower than the Piketty line in every year, but the trend need not be any different. Therefore no one should look at Giles’s chart and take that decline seriously. This is Giles’s most important error.
The 2010 data point is also Piketty’s most important potential problem. I’m pretty sure it should have just been left off of the chart. At any rate, it looks to me like Piketty is on solid ground saying that wealth concentration in the U.K. rose by about five percentage points from 1980 to 2000.
So lots of smoke, but I don’t see a fire here so far. The next explainer will look at Giles’s criticisms of the U.S. data and the question of whether wealth inequality has risen in the United States.

Source:

Tuesday, 27 May 2014

Russian Gas Reliance in Europe Skewing Sanctions Debate

While tacitly acknowledging that Russia would suffer from cutting off energy supplies to the rest of Europe, Economy Minister Alexei Ulyukayev said last week that industrywide sanctions will never happen because “our partners will suffer also, especially when it comes to Europe, which is very much dependent on the energy supply from Russia.” Photographer: Andrey Rudakov/Bloomberg


European leaders, while calling Ukraine’s May 25 presidential election a success, are still facing a deeper dilemma: how to free their countries from an addiction to Russian energy.
Pro-European billionaire Petro Poroshenko’s victory has relieved the immediate pressure on the U.S. and the European Union to impose tougher sanctions against Russia.
“The successful holding of these elections constitutes a major step towards the objective of de-escalating tensions and restoring security for all Ukrainians,” European Commission President Jose Barrosoand EU President Herman Van Rompuy said in a joint statement yesterday.
The European and American reluctance to escalate in the wake of an election that was at least a partial success, a U.S. official said yesterday, suggests that by finally tempering his actions and rhetoric, Russian President Vladimir Putin may have achieved much of what he sought in Ukraine.
Russia’s ever-changing mix of covert action, economic threats and the annexation of Crimea, followed by soothing words, the official said, has exposed the divergence of U.S. and European Union views on Russia and the EU members’ conflicting interests there, especially on energy.
“The energy crisis is a test of what the EU really is,” Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk said on May 21, calling it “a duel” over what’s more important: “bilateral relations with Russia or relations within the EU.” The only way to be “an equal partner to big suppliers” is to form a united front.

Hands Tied

Europe’s energy dependence “ties the EU’s hands a great deal -- you really have widely divergent views,” said Charles Ebinger, director of the energy security initiative at the Brookings Institution in Washington, in an interview. Fears about losing Russian natural gas have made sanctions “very weak and, in the end, fairly meaningless.”
The European Commission will publish an energy security road map tomorrow that EU leaders will consider at a June 26-27 summit. No decision on new sanctions is expected at today’s gathering of heads of state, said EU diplomats.
Russia’s threat to cut off gas supplies to Ukraine if the country doesn’t pay its back bills and agree to prepay for future supplies at a higher price presents problems for the EU, which gets half its Russian gas -- 15 percent of its total supply -- through Ukraine’s Soviet-era pipelines.
Russia cut the flow to Ukraine over price disputes in 2006 and 2009, and other European nations suffered when state-backed OAO Gazprom (GAZP) accused Ukraine of using gas meant for other nations, with some countries temporarily losing electricity during the winter.

Forging Consensus

Europe’s reliance on Russian energy has made it difficult to reach the necessary consensus on how to respond to Putin’s actions stoking unrest in eastern Ukraine and annexing the Crimean peninsula, EU diplomats said.
Russia provides 30 percent of the European Union’s natural gas, and the 28-nation bloc has few options to replace a cutoff by Russia this winter, according to a draft energy security document seen by Bloomberg.
Twelve EU member states get more than 50 percent of their gas from Russia, including four -- Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, and Latvia -- that depend on Gazprom as their sole supplier, according to Eurogas, a Brussels-based lobby group. Europe also imported 32 percent of the continent’s total crude oil consumption last year from Russia, according to the Paris-based International Energy Agency.
The chief executive of Germany’s largest power producer, RWE AG’s Peter Terium, said in a May 23 interview that it’s “sensible” to hold back on punishing Russia. “We’re treading on eggshells. You need to maneuver very carefully in order not to escalate.”

‘Very Dependent’

While tacitly acknowledging that Russia would suffer from cutting off energy supplies to the rest of Europe, Economy Minister Alexei Ulyukayev said last week that industrywide sanctions will never happen because “our partners will suffer also, especially when it comes to Europe, which is very much dependent on the energy supply from Russia.”
Russia is struggling to steady its $2 trillion economy in the face of dramatic capital outflows, market instability and a ruble that’s more than 4 percent down against the dollar this year.
Oil and gas account for 70 percent of Russia’s annual exports and more than half its federal budget, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. The country exports 80 percent of its oil and more than 70 percent of its gas to the EU, and that revenue keeps Russia’s economy afloat, the European Commission’s Barroso said in Brussels.

Not Weapon

European diplomats acknowledge that the symbiotic energy relationship makes punitive measures unpalatable. “We have stressed very firmly over the last months that energy must not be abused as a political weapon,” Barroso said last week.
Many of the EU’s members strongly oppose sanctions that would limit energy deliveries from Russia. Instead, they favor efforts to engage Russia in dialogue and boost stability and democracy in Ukraine, according to several European diplomats in Washington and Brussels who weren’t authorized to be quoted.
“The farther east you go -- Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, the Baltic states -- you have a much higher dependence on Russian energy,” and those nations see over-reliance “as a direct security threat,” said Ebinger, who has advised European governments on energy policy.
While the EU in the last two months has frozen assets of scores of Ukrainians and Russians accused of fueling unrest and two energy companies that were expropriated by Russia when it annexed Crimea, Europe hasn’t imposed any sanctions that would block trade with Russia.

Higher Prices

Slovak Premier Robert Fico last week said his government, which agreed to transport gas from Western Europe to Ukraine under a reverse flow deal, “isn’t inclined” toward more sanctions. Europe, he said, shouldn’t be “pushed into some global conflict. It would be a suicide for the economy.”
Irish communications, energy and natural resources Minister Pat Rabbitte said in an interview that while he thinks Russia is unlikely to cut supplies, if it did, “It’d almost inevitably have an impact on price” across Europe.
As Europe pulls out of a recession, gas shortages would hit heating, electricity and industrial production, and rattle confidence. Again, though, the effects would be uneven and potentially divisive.
Some countries, including Latvia and Germany, have stored many months of supplies and could withstand a short-term shutoff more easily, officials say; others have few reserves.

New Urgency

Still, the Ukraine crisis has added urgency to proposals for greater European energy security, a movement that in the long term would reduce Russia’s leverage. Expanding inventories, developing reverse flows, expanding renewable energy sources, improving efficiency and forming a common reserve could reduce the short-term shock from any Russian cut-off as the EU sets its energy and climate policies for the decade starting in 2020.
Here, too, Europe is divided, however. A group of predominantly eastern and central EU nations led by Poland argue that the crisis shows Europe should invest in domestic energy, such as coal and shale gas.
Many western states, including Germany and Denmark, argue that stricter emissions standards, more renewable energy and higher efficiency would cut imports and accelerate a shift to a low-carbon economy.
If Russia makes good on its threat to cut off gas to Ukraine, the Nord Stream pipeline between Vyborg, Russia, and Greifswald, Germany, is an alternate route to get Russian gas to the rest of Europe, and interconnectors would allow gas to flow among neighbors.

Other Sources

While Norwegian, Algerian or British gas could replace some losses from Russia, prices are higher, and those nations have existing customers. Developing a southern corridor from the Caspian Sea region and Iraq, and increased liquefied natural gas imports from Qatar and the U.S. are longer-term fixes.
Poland, with its history of tense relations with Russia, has invested in an LNG terminal to wean itself off Russian gas, and Lithuania has said it will do the same. Investing in infrastructure for LNG from Qatar or the U.S. is costly, however, and other EU members have balked at the price.
The divisions within the EU over the costs to member states’ economies extend beyond the energy sector. The U.K. and Cyprus are among those concerned about financial sanctions that would imperil capital flows between their banks and Russian institutions; in the first three quarters of 2013, $16 billion flowed to Russia from British banks and $12.9 billion from Cypriot banks, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. In the same period, $61 billion flowed from Russia to the British Virgin Islands, and $7.5 billion went to Cyprus.

French Ships

France is worried about a $1.6 billion sale of two Mistral helicopter carriers to Russia that would be imperiled by an arms ban. Greece, Italy and other Southern European states profit from Russian tourism and luxury-goods purchases, and are advocating more diplomacy and less punitive action.
Whenever there’s a crisis with Russia, especially over energy, “suddenly it’s all hands on deck,” Amanda Paul, an analyst at the European Policy Centre in Brussels, said in an interview. “Frenzy lasts for a short period of time, and then we get back into our usual way of doing things: very slowly, not necessarily united.”
----With assistance from Radoslav Tomek in Bratislava, Slovakia, Daryna Krasnolutska in Kiev,Ryan Chilcote in St. Petersburg, Tino Andresen in Dusseldorf, Alexandre Tanzi in Washington and James Herron in London.
To contact the reporters on this story: Indira A.R. Lakshmanan in Washington at ilakshmanan@bloomberg.net; Ewa Krukowska in Brussels at ekrukowska@bloomberg.net
To contact the editors responsible for this story: John Walcott at jwalcott9@bloomberg.net Jones Hayden
Source: